Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Richard H. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Products, Inc., Utah
Industrial Commission, And State Insurance Fund : Petitioner's
Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Virginia Curtis Lee; Attorney for Petitioner
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Products, No. 19100 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4658

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. SHEPHERD,
Applicant and Petitioner,
vs.

DIVERSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC.,
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Case No. 19100

Defendants and Respondents.
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
Appeal from Final Order of the Utah State Industrial Commission
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
FRANK NELSON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
124 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT,
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JAMES R. BLACK
BLACK & MOORE
SUITE 500, TEN WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT,
STATE INSURANCE FUND
GILBERT MARTINEZ
ADMINISTRATOR SECOND INJURY FUND
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
P. 0. BOX 5800
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-5800

f l LED
CJ,_:::,

S.'°''"''

Co,ri, Ut.h

IN THE SJPREME
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

f: j CH A H (J

I'

o 11 f P rl E P n ,

Petitioner,

Appl1•.rnt
\j

s.

DiVCPSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC.,
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Case No. 19100

Defendants and Respondents.
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
Appeal from Final Order of the Utah State Industrial Commission

VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
FRANK NELSON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
124 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT,
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
JAMES R. BLACK
BLACV & MOOPt
SUITE 500. TEN WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE Cl rr. UTAH 84101
ATTORNEY
RESPONDENT,
STATt
FUND
:_,

8 E_

R

T M11 11 : , i'J

AI J l•l I 1•1 '. :- ' • '\ 1 I'
I b ,-1 Lg
I
-, 1'111
; Hl

r

110
1 /\,

l

CU•'IU
I

.f-i

I N,J IJ RY F UN D

34110-5800

i

l1R1_r

ii P r '1 i1 F
D FI

I

!

I

!--',I

[

fJ,

llF CONTENTS
n F THE CASE

L

2

COMM!SS:ON ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
POWERS lN AWARDING PETITIONER BENEFITS
FROM rHE SELUHD :NJURY FUND FOR ONLY 10% OF THE
:NG MILITARY PERMANENT PARTIAL D!SABILlJES RATHER THAN AWARDING PETITIONER COMPENSATION
AS
BY
35-1-69 ON THE BASIS OF HIS
COMBINED PPE-EXI51 ING INJURIES RATED BY THE COMMISSION TO Ell 32·
........ 7
1

Comµensation should be determined by the
law in effect at the time of the injury . 8
The law in effect at the time of the injury
...... 9
Histcrical purpose of post-war enactment
of special fund legislation . . • .
10
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling
him to compensation from the Second lnJury Fund
. . . . • . . •
12
Merger of successive disabilities entitles Petitioner to compensation from
the Second Injury Fund
. . . .

14

Petitioner's permanent incapacity is subst ant q l l y qreater than he would have incurrPd if he had not had the pre-existing
inr,-,p,1(1t;
. . • . . . . . . . 16
Nn

,-

u t I 1 r' r

,- ,,,,.,, P, -,

t'

I

I

'I

-d y
Jr 1 ,_rn

e x i st s t o deny Pet i t i oner
f r o the Second Injury Fund
military impairment on
"rJiJuble recovery"

19

21

CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Carpinelli v. Penn. Steel Castings Co. et al., 209
Pa.Super. 390, 227 A.2d 912 (1967) . . . . . • ll,
David v. Industrial Commission et al., Utah, 649
P.2d 82 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

20

Hermansen v. Webster Outdoor Advertising Co., 230
So.2d 145 (Fla. 1 9 7 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega,
P.2d 617 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . . . . . . . . .

Utah,

562

17,

19, 21

Intermountain Smelting v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d
334 (1980) . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,

10,

Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden and
State Insurance Fund, Utah, 656 P.2d 440
(1982) . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .

8,

15, 23

McPhie v.
(1976)

10,

U.S. Steel Corp., Utah, 551
............. ,

P.2d 504
. . . . .

17,

15,

19,

Northwest Carriers et al. v. Industrial Comm' n. et
al. and Ingersoll et al. v. Camp et al., Utah,
639 P.2d 138 (1981)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital et al.,
420 (1982) . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Industrial Commission,
( 1976) . . • . . • . . . . .

Utah,
. .

Utah,

.

656 P.2d
. . . 20

549 P.2d 448
. . . . . . 8

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. lndustri al Comm'n. et al., Utah, 657 P.2d 764
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13,

18, 22

White v. Indus tr i al Comm ' n . , Nebo School Di st r i ct
et al. v. Cragun et al, & the Paris Co. et al.
v. Industrial Comm'n. et al., Utah 604 P.2d
478 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,

18, 21

Statutes

L. 1921, ch. 67, Section 3140, sub. 6 . . . . . . ll
ii

Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended . . . . . . . . . . .

• . 16

Authorities
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Section 59.32(f), pp. 10-444 to 10-447 . . • . . • . 14, 15

, ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. SHEPHERD,
Applicant and Petitioner,
vs.
DIVERSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC.,
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Case No. 19100

Defendants and Respondents.
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for review of a final order entered
by a majority of the Utah State Industrial Commission on
March 8, 1983.

The commission awarded Petitioner temporary

total disability benefits for a period of six months; benefits
for 5% permanent partial impairment sustained in an industrial
accident on December l, 1979; and benefits for 10% pre-existing
permanent partial impairment incurred during World War II while
Petitioner was in the military service of the United States.
The Commission denied Petitioner compensation from the Second
lnJury Fund for the remainder of his 37% combined injuries.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Pet1t1oner seeks reversal of the Commission's denial of

compensation from the Second Injury Fund for the remainder
of his 37% combined injuries.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the course of his employment with the defendant
company on December l, 1979, the Petitioner fell and struck
on the edge of an open pit and on a pipe.
R. 168)

(R. 167, R. 164 and

Petitioner was knocked unconscious.

and R. 168)

(R. 167, R. 164

In the process of the fall, he hit his neck

against a steam pipe causing some burns and his right hip
hit the corner of the pit opening. (R. 168)
This incident occurred about 12:00 noon.

Petitioner

tried to continue work after recovering but could not do so
effectively. (R. 168)

Peitioner drove himself to the emer-

gency room of the L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City where
x-rays were taken.

(R. 12-13, R. 168)

It was noted

that Petitioner had an abrasion of the right hip and a muscle strain of the right side of the neck.

He was given a

sling and advised to rest and take pain medications. (R. 168)
He continued to have pain in his neck, back and shoulder.
year.

He was off work until mid-January of the following
He was terminated by his company.

He feels he could

have done some of the work, but apparently could not do all
that was expected of him.

He continued to have

in the right side of his neck.

(R. 164)

Petitioner could not return to work December 3, because
he was having problems with his lower back, shoulder, cla-

v1cle and neck.

(R. 168)

On December 3, he visited the

V.A. Hospital, Dr. Latimer and a chiropractor, Dr. Wayman.
HP did not return to the V.A. Hospital for treatment of

this inJury but did return to the V.A. Hospital around
March 10, 1980, for another problem. (R. 168)
has had black out attacks since the accident.

Petitioner
(R. 169)

By way of history, while in the military service the
Petitioner was thrown from a truck and suffered back, shoulder, hip and leg injuries from which he was disabled until
about December 1945. (R. 169)

More particularly, Petitioner

was thrown out of the truck onto his neck and shoulder, sustaining a cervical fracture, a dislocation of both shoulders, an injury to both ankles, fractured ribs, injury to
hips and knees dislocated.

(R. 74, R. 26)

In 1946 he re-

ceived a 20% disability rating from the Veterans Administration and then in 1977 he received a government combined
rating of 60%, which included 40% for his back. (R. 169)
The medical panel did not merely restate the 60% rating
given Petitioner by the Veterans Administration, but assigned him 20% pre-existing permanent partial impairment for
his lower back, 10

pre-existing permanent partial impair-

ment for his neck and 5% pre-existing permanent partial impairment for sensory loss from surgery to relieve the pain
of the war injuries. (R. 166)

In 1962, Petitioner had a

rh1z0tomy on his lower back to alleviate the pain he suffered
from the service injury.

(R. 74, R. 24-25)
3

The Medical Panel Report was submitted in evidence and
the findings therein were adopted by the Administrative Law
Judge as his own:
"l.

The percentage of permanent partial

impairment at this time is as follows:
Percent of Whole Man

Involvements

Low Back
Neck
Sensory Loss ('11rgery)

Pre-existing

Related to Injury

20 Percent
l 0 Percent
5 Percent

0 Percent
5 Percent
0 PF>rcent

Syncope of uncertain etiology:
Note:
From the present information, it seems
unlikely that there is a direct connection between
the syncopal episodes and the effects of the injury.
There is no confirmation of any certain period of
unconsciousness from an injury to the head at the
time, and those who saw the patient most immediately
did not record any unconsciousness or neuro-symptoms
whatsoever. The initial events were quite delayed
and apparently related to emotional factors as much
as anything. However, this formulation may be modified by more definitive information which may become
available to the panel members. (R. 169)
2. A reasonable period of temporary total disability is set at six months, as being ample time for
recovery from the physical effects of the injury . .
( R.

l 70)

The Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant
is entitled to temporary total disability compensation based on six months or 26 weeks . . . The applicant is further entitled to permanent partial impairment benefits base on
. . . The medical panel found
the applicant had a pre-existing impairment of
which would combine to
The applicant has been
compensated for more than that amount in pre-existing
permanent partial impairment benefits and is not entitled to additional benefits from the Second Injury
Fund for that purpose. The insurance carrier, however,
is entitled to reimbursement for a portion of its medical costs and temporary total disability compensation
payments, which reimbursement should be based on a
4

ratio of 32/37's of the amounts paid by the State
'.nsurance Fund." (R. 170)
The Administrative Law Judge ordered, inter alia:
l.

The State Insurance Fund pay Petitioner $4,000

for temporary total disability compensation and $2, 184 for
permanent partial impairment benefits attributable to the
industrial accident.
2.

The Second Injury Fund reimburse the State

Insurance Fund for 32/37's of the medical costs and temporary
total disability.

(R. 170)

On or about June 7, 1982, Petitioner, by and through
counsel, timely filed a Motion for Review alleging the Administrative Law Judge had erred in not awarding Petitioner compensation for pre-existing conditions. (R. 173-174)
On January 13, 1983, a majority of the Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's award of temporary total disability benefits and compensation for 5% permanent
partial impairment resulting from the December l, 1979, industrial accident.

(R. 179-182)

However, the Commission re-

versed the Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits for
Petitioner's permanent for the pre-existing 10% condition of
the neck.

The Commission ordered,

. that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the
State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury
Fund, to pay the Applicant compensation at the rate
of 5140.00 per week for 31.2 weeks or a total of
$4,368.00, as compensation for a 10% permanent partial impairment attributable to pre-existing conditions, said amount to be paid in a lump sum." (R.180)
5

With respect to compensation for the full
mainder of Petitioner's

re-

combined permanent partial im-

pairment, the majority wrote:
" . . . But common sense would dictate that the same
rules precluding double compensation from workmen's
compensation should apply for pre-existing problems
which were fully compensated and were not exacerbated by the industrial accident." (R. 179)
Commissioner Saathoff dissented from the majority:
"The original Order of the Administrative Law
Judge denied pre-existing disability benefits to the
applicant, but awarded reimbursement to the State
Insurance Fund. The Motion for Review filed by the
applicant was on this issue.
In my opinion the statute requires that the applicant is entitled to
benefits under Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated
before the insurance carrier is eligible for reimbursement. The majority of the Commission makes the
assumption that the Legislature intended that all
pre-existing disability that has previously been compensated, should be denied, even though incurred in
the military service of our country.
I do not read
this intent into Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated.
I do, however, concur that any permanent partial
disability resulting from an industrial accident,
once compensated should not be compensated again.
The majority also assumes that statute gives the Commission the authority to separate pre-existing disabilities and to award benefits from the Second Injury
Fund only for those pre-existing disabilities which
are to the same portion of the body as was injured in
the industrial accident, again,
I do not interpret
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, to give the Commission the authority to separate these disabilities
in determining Second Injury Fund benefits.
I believe this policy would defeat one of the main purposes of that Section, which is to encourage employers
to hire people who have some degree of pre-existing
disability.
I think recent Supreme Court decisions
have upheld this concept.
I would therefore grant the
Motion for Review, except for awarding benefits for
the 5% sensory loss." (R. 181)
Petitioner adopted Commissioner Saathoff's arguments and
on or about January 27, 1983, filed a Motion for Review of
the January 13 Order.

( R. 183-189 I
6

On March 8, 1983, the

maiority denied Petitioner's Motion for Review and affirmed
its Order of January 13. (R. 191-192)
hoff again dissented.

(R. 191)

Commissioner Saat-

Petitioner has appealed from

that March 8, 1983, Denial of Motion for Review. (R. 194-197)
That appeal is before this Court now.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS STATUTORY
POWERS IN AWARDING PETITIONER BENEFITS FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND FOR ONLY
OF PRE-EXISTING MILITARY PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITIES RATHER THAN AWARDING PETITIONER COMPENSATION AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-1-69 ON THE BASIS OF HIS
COMBINED PRE-EXISITNG INJURIES RATED BY THE COMMISSION TO BE
32

The compensation to which Petitioner is entitled should
be determined by the law in effect at the time of the injury
in 1979.

The law in effect in 1979 reflected no legislative

intent to deny benefits from the Second Injury Fund on the
basis of precluding double recovery.

The historical purpose

of the Second Injury Fund statutes in effect at the time of
the injury was to encourage the hiring of handicapped veterans and civilians returning from war by creating the "special fund."
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling him to compensation from the Second Injury Fund for his 32% preexisting military permanent partial impairment.

The merger

af Petitioner's successive disabilities entitles him to
cumpensation from the Second lnJury Fund_

Petitioner's 37%

µermanent partial impairment is substantially greater than
7
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6.
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comDined injuries is greater that the compensation
which eccept to the pre-e1isting disabi lit; would
have been payable for the latter injury, the emplo;ee shall receive compensation on the basis of the
combined injuries, but the liability of his employer
sha 11 be for the latter injury only and the remainder
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for
1n subdivision l of this section."
L. 1921, ch. 67.
:t fairly can be said from the date of enactment, that
the legislature intended through the enactment Jf subsection
6 to encourage the hiring of handicapped veterans and civilians returning from war by creating the "special fund."
Pennsylvania's second injury fund was created just
after World War II.

In a case quite similar to the case at

bar, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a handicapped employee, who had previously lost his right leg (presumably 1n the military service of the United States) and who
l a t e r s u s t a i n e d a n i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y, wa s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e
hµne•its from that state's second injury reserve fund.
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was anticipated.

The Pennsylvania legislature had indicated

in its journal that the underlying purpose of the statutes
was to 1 i be r a 1 i z e the comp ens at 1 on l aw "to g i v e the hand i capped worker greater opportunity and . . . to provide less
risk for employers . . . "

The court ruled that the Workmen's

Compensation Law, being remedial legislation, should be
construed in favor of those it intended to benefit.

The

court affirmed the order of the Workmen's Compensation Board
awarding the employee compensation from the second injury
reserve fund.
The Utah legislature intended through the enactment
of statutes creating the "special fund" in 1921 to encourage the hiring of handicapped veterans by relieving employers of liability for pre-existing impairment.

The Utah

1 e g i s 1 at u r e h a s n o t s-;-nTe r e pe a 1e d t h e " s p e c i a l f u n d " s t a tutes or expressed an intent that the veterans the laws historically intended to benefit should be dispossessed.
To affirm the Commission's denial of Second Injury Fund
compensation for Petitioner's pre-existing war injuries would
be to disembowel the "special fund" statutes of the very
purpose for which they were created.

This Court must reverse

the Commission's denial of benefits from the Second Injury
Fund for the remainder of Petitioner's 37'; permanent partial
impairment.
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling him to compensation
from the Second Injury Fund
Explicit statutory authority exists to award compensal2

t1on from the Second Injury Fund, provided pertinent
conditions are met.
1n number:
tal

l)

Basically, those conditions are three

permanent incapacity occasioned by acciden-

inJury, disease or congenital causes, followed by 2)

subsequent injury resulting in further permanent incapacity
which is 3) substantially greater than that which would have
been incurred had there been no pre-existing incapacity.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Industrial Comm'n. et al., Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (1983). These conditions
are the conditions set forth in Section 35-1-69, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner had
sustained permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental injury which occurred during World War II, while he was in the
military service of the United States.

The medical panel

determined, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that
Petitioner suffered a combined 32% pre-existing permanent
partial impairment as the result of military injuries and
surgery to relieve the pain of the injuries.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner incurred subsequent industrial injury on December l, 1979,
which resulted in further permanent partial incapacity of
uf the whole man.

The permanent incapacity resulting from

thP industrial accident was substantially greater than that
which would have been incurred had there been no pre-existing
111capac1ty.
"ri t

But for Petitioner's impaired agility he would

have suffered any i n jury at al l when he s l i pp e d on the
l3

ice and grease at the edge of the pit.
Merger of successive d1sabil1ties entitles Petitioner to compensation from the Second Injury Fund
The majority attempts to narrow the range of Second Injury Fund liability by denying compensation from the Fund
for that portion of pre-existing problems which "were not
exacerbated by the industrial accident." (R. 179)

The Com-

mission awarded Petitioner permanent partial benefits for
the pre-existing

condition of the neck.

The majority

wrote:
. This area was directly involved in the
industrial accident and the condition was substantially worsened as a result of that incident."
( R.

180)

The majority misconstrues the "merger" doctrine as it
generally applies

in second injury fund cases.

Professor

Larson writes:
" . . . The question sometimes arises whether the
second injury must be shown to have been related
to or to have acted upon the prior injury (footnote
omitted) - as, for example, when the loss of a thumb
combines with previous loss of fingers of the same
hand.
It is generally held that no such special
relation between the injuries is necessary, so long
as the existence of the former substantially augments the disability ensuing from the latter." Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2,
59.32{f), pp. I0-444 to I0-447.
The learned professor concludes that even though injuries
are not physically related, where a merger of successive
disabilities takes place, a claimant is entitled to an
award from the second injury fund.
In a footnote, Professor Larson cites rlermansen v. WebIJ

Outdoor Advertising Co., 230 So.Zd 145 (Fla. 1970),
where a finding that the claimant's prior leg injury had not
"merqed" with a subsequent injury because the leg condition
wJs in no way affected by the second injury was held to be
error, since merger does not require a reinjury of the previously injured part of the body.

Larson, supra, footnote

at the bottom of p. 10-446.
This Court has recently recognized the generally held
requirement that where a merger of successive disabilities
takes place a claimant is entitled to an award from the
Second Injury Fund.

In Kincheloe, supra, the Court wrote:

"Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact
that the 1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury
is not dispositive.
Irrespective of any causal connection, the second injury fund is to compensate one
who sustains "permanent incapacity which is substantially greater that he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity."
The claimant in Kincheloe would have been entitled to an
award from the Second Injury Fund, but for the fact that the
Administrative Law Judge had found that he had recovered from
the 15% prior permanent parital pre-existing impairment he
had sustained prior to his 1980 5% permanent partial industrial impairment.
The Commission erred in denying Petitioner compensation from the Second Injury Fund for all of his comt11ned 32' pre-existing impairment and in awarding Petitioner
,11n pen

s at i on for on l y t he l O
only the

pre - ex i st i ng neck con di ti on ,

pre-existing neck impairment was agl5

gra1ated by the

accident.

The Commission

found that the neck condition was substantially worsened
as a result of the industrial accident.

Merger does not

require a reinjury of each part of the body previously
impaired.

The Commission's finding that the neck con-

dition was substantially worsened as a result of the industrial accident satisfies the requirement for compensation from the Second Injury Fund that Petitioner have
suffered permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had not had the
pre-existing incapacity.

This Court must reverse the Com-

mission's denial of compensation for all of the remainder
of Petitioner's combined injuries.
Petitioner's permanent incapacity is substantially greater
than

he

would have incurred if he had not had the pre-

existing incapacity
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provided on December l, 1979, in pertinent part:
(1)
If any employee, who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial
injury for which compensation and medical care is
provided by this title that results in permanent
incapacity which is substantially greater than
he would have incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity, compensation and medical care
. . . shall be awarded on the basis of the combined
injuries, but the liability of the employer for
such compensation shall be for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of
the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68
hereinafter referred to as the "special fund."
(Emphasis added.)

l6

The Industrial Commission has struggled with the language "sub st anti ally greater."

In Intermountai n Health

Care v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617 (1977), this Court
construed the language "substantially greater."

There

Justice Crockett wrote:
The requirement that the pre-existing condition
combines with the later injury to cause a "substantially greater" permanent incapacity does not mean
that the former must be greater than the latter.
It simply means that it be some definite and measurable portion of the causation of the disability."
562 P.2d at 619.
In Ortega, the Commission, as directors of the Second
lnJury Fund, posed its denial of benefits from the Second
Injury Fund on the ostensible basis that because the preexisting condition was quiescent and did not require medical treatment until the accident, the employer should be
held responsible for the expenses thereof.

The Court pointed

out:
" . . . that if the requirement of the statute is
met, that is, if the resulting permanent incapacity
is substantially greater than if the pre-existing
incapacity had not existed, the proportionate causation must be found and that portion attributable
to the previous condition paid out of the special
fund.
(See McPhie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d
504 (Utah 1976), concurring op1n1on of Justice
Ellett.) Ortega, supra.
In White v. Industrial Comm'n., Nebo School District
et al. v. Cragun et al., and the Paris Co. et al. v. IncJustrial Comm'n. et al., Utah 604 P.2d 478 (1979), this
Court instructed the Industrial Commission to award comfrom the Second Injury Fund where pre-existing
impairment was followed by further permanent incapacities
l7

of 5% in the cases of applicants Christensen and White.
The Court expressed no reservation regarding whether
the 5% further incapacities incurred by applicants Christensen and White were substantially greater than those
which would have been incurred had there been no preexisting incapacities.
Similarly, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, supra, the Court expressed no reservation regarding whether the possible 5% further incapacity incurred by the applicant there was substantially greater
than that which would have been incurred had there been
no pre-existing incapacity.

The Court wrote:

" . . . It is therefore necessary to remand this
case to the Commission for the purpose of submitting (the issue of a medical panel determination of
the impairment resulting from the industrial accident) to an appropriate medical .panel. The medical
panel shall then review the medical aspects of this
case and determine the percentage of impairment
resulting from the subsequent injury. After having
been apprised of the determinations of the medical
panel, the Commission shall then assign liability
for the payment of present and future medicals."
657 P.Zd at 767.
The Court instructed the Commission to determine whether
the subsequent injuries sustained resulted in further permanent incapacity "which is substantially greater than he
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity."
In the case at bar, Petitioner's 5% industrial impairment is 13.5% of the total impairment that he has suffered.
18

Under Ortega, McPhie and White, the law in effect at the time
of Petitioner's industrial injury, Petitioner's pre-existing
combined 32'1, impairment was a "definite and measurable portion of the causation of Petitioner's total 37% combined
d i s a b i l i t y. "

I t f a i r l y c a n b e s a i d t h at t h at Pet i t i oner ' s

combined 32

impairment was a definite and measurable por-

tion of the causation of Petitioner's subsequent 5% industrial impairment; but for Petitioner's reduced agility,
he would not have suffered any industrial injury.

Peti-

tioner's pre-existing condition increased the resulting
disability by 86.5%.

Consequently, under the requirements

of the statute in effect at the time of Petitioner's industrial accident, it follows that compensation should have
been awarded from the Second Injury Fund for all of Petitioner's combined 32% per-existing impairment.

The Court

must reverse the Order of the majority denying Petitioner
compensation for all but 10% of his pre-existing permanent
partial impairment.
No authority exists to deny Petitioner compensation from
the Second Injury Fund for pre-existing military impairment on the basis of "double recovery"
In 1981, the legislature did change the law in an
apparent attempt to preclude "double recovery."

Because

the industrial injury aggravated Petitioner's pre-existing
injury and because Petitioner's pre-existing injury was
not compensated for under the Workmen's Compensation Act or
19

the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, the 1981
amendments would not preclude recovery in this case.

Re-

cent case law would not preclude recovery in this case
either.

In Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital et al., Utah,

656 P.2d 420 (1982), the Court held that an injured employee should not be permitted to recover against the Second
Injury Fund for a pre-existing condition attributable to
an industrial injury for which he has already been compensated under the Workmen's Compensation laws of another state.
In David v. Industrial Commission et al., Utah, 649 P.Zd
8 2

(1982), the Court held that where an injured employee

applied simultaneously for compensation for a pre-existing
injury and for a subsequent industrial injury, the employee was not entitled to an additional award from the
Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing impairment.

Neither

case stands for the proposition that a disabled American
veteran permanently partially impaired as a result of an
industrial accident should be denied compensation from the
"special fund" created by the legislature to encourage the
hiring of handicapped veterans.
World War I and II may be far behind us now, but that
does not entitle the Commission to abrogate legislation intended, in some small way, to repay the debt the citizens
of this state felt they owed to those who risked their lives
and limbs to defend our precious nation.

That the Congress

chose to express its gratitude to our veterans by enacting
20

legislation to compensate them for injuries sustained in
the service of our nation should not be held against these
brave men.

The laws intended to honor our veterans must

be upheld.

Lest we forget.
CONCLUSION

In McPhie, supra, the Commission refused the applicant
compensation from the Second Injury Fund on the basis that
his

permanent total impairment was not substantially

greater than he would have incurred if he had not had a
pre-existing

incapacity.

The Court remanded the case

to the Commission to make new findings regarding whether
the applicant's permanent 100% incapacity was substantially
greater than if he had not had a major pre-existing impairment.
In Ortega, supra, the Commission denied proportionate
contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the employer
because the applicant's pre-existing condition remained quiesecent and did not require medical treatment until the subsequent industrial accident.

The Court reversed the Com-

mission's denial of contribution from the fund.
In White, supra, the Commission refused to order proportional contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the
employer on the bases that the 3-year statute of limitat1,ins on the pre-existing injury had run (Christensen,
1

that the permanent incapacity was not substantially
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greater than would have been incurred if applicant had not
had the pre-existing condition (Christensen, White), and
that the applicant was better off after the industrial accident by having had the pre-existing condition taken care
of and stabilized (White). The Court reversed the Commission's denial of contribution from the fund.
In Capitano, supra, the Commission denied proportional
contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the employer for
medical and temporary total disability payments on the bases
that the applicant's pre-existing injury had nothing to do
with the subsequent industrial injury or the medical expenses or temporary total disability payments incident
thereto and that payment of medical and temporary total
disability would deplete the fund.

The Commission made no

attempt there to argue that the applicant should be denied
compensation

for

his pre-existing service connected im-

pairment because he was receiving veterans disability
compensation from the United States government for his war
injuries.

The Court reversed the Commission's denial of

contribution

from

the fund.

In U.S.F.&G., supra, the Commission apportioned present and future medical expenses between the pre-existing
and subsequent insurance carriers

and refused to order

proportional contribution from the Second Injury Fund where
pre-existing and industrial impairment had resulted from

22

four separate industrial accidents on the basis that the
pre-exi>ting and industrial impairment had resulted from
an industrial accident, rather than from other non-industrial accidental, disease, of congenital causes.

The

Court did not subscribe to the reasoning of the Commission.
In Northwest Carriers et al. v. Industrial Comm'n et
al. and Ingersoll et al. v. Camp et al., Utah, 639 P.Zd
138 (1981), the Commission denied reimbursement from

the

Second Injury Fund to the State Insurance Fund for extrinsic factors contributing to total disability.

The

Court ordered reimbursement from the fund.
In Kincheloe, supra, the Commission attempted to deny
compensation and proportionate contribution, inter alia,
on the basis that the part of the body injured in the industrial accident bore no relation to the part of the body
previously injured.

The Court indicated the fact that

the industrial injury was unrelated to the previous injury
was not dispositive.
In the case at bar, the Commission again resolutely
denies payment from the Second Injury Fund under theories
inapplicable

to the circumstances involved.

To date the"

legislature had expressed no intent to repudiate the historical purpose of the Second Injury Fund to encourage the
l1H1ng of handicapped veterans and civilians returning from
wctr by conferring a benefit upon employers.
23

The Court

must construe the remedial Second Injury Fund statute, Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in
favor of one of those it intended to benefit.
The merger of Petitioner's successive
military impairment with the

pre-existing

industrial impairment has

resulted in permanent partial impairment substantially
greater than Petitioner would have incurred if he had not
been disabled during World War II.

The Commission found

that Petitioner's condition was "substantially worsened
as a result of that incident." (R. 180)

The fact that Pe-

titioner's back was not reinjured in the 1979 industrial
accident is no basis for denying him compensation from the
Second Injury Fund.

The fact that the industrial impair-

ment is a definite and measurable portion of the causation
of Petitioner's 37% permanent partial disability is dispositive.

The Court must reverse the Order of the Majority

denying Petitioner compensation for all but 10% of his preexisting permanent partial military impairment and must order
the Commission to award Petitioner compensation from the
Second Injury Fund for the remainder of his combined injuries.
DATED this

.Lj jt_ day
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